The dual role of human dignity in bioethics by Andorno, Roberto
SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION
The dual role of human dignity in bioethics
Roberto Andorno
Published online: 16 December 2011
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract This paper argues that some of the misunder-
standings surrounding the meaning and function of the
concept of human dignity in bioethics arise from a lack of
distinction between two different roles that this notion
plays: one as an overarching policy principle, and the other
as a moral standard of patient care. While the former is a
very general concept which fulfils a foundational and a
guiding role of the normative framework governing bio-
medical issues, the latter reflects a much more concrete and
context-specific understanding of the patient as a ‘‘person’’.
The importance of dignity as a policy principle will be
described by appealing to the distinction between princi-
ples and rules as developed by some legal philosophers.
The value of dignity as a standard of patient care will be
illustrated with the help of concrete examples and by
drawing on the taxonomies of dignity proposed by Jona-
than Mann and other scholars. The overall scope of the
article is to highlight this double and complementary role
of human dignity in bioethics.
Keywords Human dignity  Bioethics  Biolaw 
Principles
Introduction
During the last decade, the notion of human dignity has
been at the centre of a heated debate concerning the role (if
any) that this concept is called to play in bioethics, and in
particular in the policy documents on biomedical issues.
On the one hand, this notion is at the foundation of the
international human rights system which emerged in the
aftermath of the Second World War, and more recently, of
the international documents relating to bioethics adopted
by intergovernmental bodies such as the UN, UNESCO,
and the Council of Europe. On the other hand, the invo-
cation of dignity in bioethical discourse has attracted
serious criticisms from a number of philosophers who see it
as a purely rhetorical or political notion. In an already
famous article in the BMJ, Ruth Macklin has called dignity
a ‘‘useless concept’’ since, in her view, it means no more
than ‘‘respect for autonomy’’ and can therefore be simply
‘‘eliminated without any loss of content’’ (Macklin 2003).
It is interesting to note that Macklin’s argument was
rejected with vehemence by several doctors and nurses
who wrote rapid responses to the BMJ between December
2003 and January 2004. They claim that dismissing dignity
risks disregarding the ultimate rationale for respecting each
patient as a unique and irreplaceable person. Also, they
argue that dignity cannot simply be equated with autonomy
because, as one of them writes, ‘‘one may treat a patient
with respect in the ways the author refers to, like honoring
their autonomy, and still not treat them with the dignity
they deserve. I have seen many times an informed consent
filled out by patients treated with little dignity’’ (Taylor
2003). Moreover, dignity cannot be a synonym of auton-
omy for the simple reason that also people with greatly
limited autonomy (such as those suffering mental retarda-
tion) or those who totally lack moral autonomy (like
newborns) are widely regarded as having dignity (Allison
2003; Ford 2003).
Commenting on this debate, Alex Capron has rightly
pointed out that the controversy is somehow misleading
because both Macklin and her critics are talking of dif-
ferent things: the former are concerned with dignity in the
particular sense of treating patients in a dignified fashion,
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while Macklin criticizes the use of the term in a general
manner, as is conveyed by international policy instruments
relating to bioethics (Capron 2003). However, in my
opinion, it would be wrong to conclude from this that there
is a ‘‘bad’’ use of dignity (as a general principle) and a
‘‘good’’ one (as a concrete vision of patient’s care). The
aim of this article is precisely to argue that there is no real
conflict between these two different approaches to human
dignity. Rather, they can be regarded as two complemen-
tary expressions of the same widely shared view that all
human beings possess an equal and inherent worth.
Dignity as an overarching policy principle
Human dignity in international human rights law
The entire international human rights system that emerged
after 1945, as well as the legal systems of all democratic
countries are based on the assumption that people do really
have inherent dignity and are therefore entitled to basic
rights. In modern political thought, the state’s raison d’eˆtre
is precisely to promote and secure respect for dignity and
rights. This presupposes that legal norms do not create
human rights from nothing; that people’s rights are not the
capricious invention of lawmakers, who could legitimately
revoke them in a change of humour. Rather, individual
states, as well as the international community, are morally
obliged to recognize that all people have basic rights (i.e.
that they have equally valid claims to basic goods) because
these latter derive from the dignity which is inherent in
every human being. This is precisely what is meant by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) when it
provides that ‘‘everyone has the right to recognition
everywhere as a person before the law’’ (Article 6).
Certainly, the practical efficacy of promoting human
rights is significantly aided by their legal recognition by
states. But the ultimate validity of basic rights is charac-
teristically thought of as not conditional upon such rec-
ognition (Nickel 1987). The explicit use of the verb ‘‘to
recognize’’ in the UDHR, which denotes the formal
acknowledgment of something that already exists, is very
illuminating in this respect.
It is noteworthy in this regard that legal systems do not
present the notion of human dignity as a merely meta-
physical hypothesis or as an arbitrary legal fiction, but as
the indispensable basis for the fair functioning of human
society. All human beings qua humans are regarded as
really deserving to be treated with unconditional respect
and entitled with basic rights regardless of age, sex,
physical or mental abilities, ethnic origin, religion, political
ideas, socio-economic status, or any other particular con-
dition or circumstance. This is the core idea behind the
concept of human dignity.
At this point it should be noted that, contrary to what is
sometimes maintained in bioethical circles, especially in
the Anglo-American context, the idea of intrinsic human
dignity does not rely on a ‘‘speciesist’’ claim, i.e. on the
merely biological fact of belonging to the species Homo
sapiens. Rather, it is based on the indisputable fact that
human beings are entities capable, as a kind, of under-
standing, self-understanding, loving, self-determining by
judging and choosing, expressing themselves by means of
arts, etc. These extraordinary abilities that characterize
human beings as a kind and qualitatively distinguish them
from all other known living beings (even if those capacities
are not currently present in all human individuals, or not in
all to the same degree) make of every human being
something absolutely unique, precious and irreplaceable.
Certainly, if there were other entities in the universe
besides human beings having, as a kind, the above men-
tioned capacities, they would also have intrinsic dignity
(Sulmasy 2007).
Another recurrent objection to the use of human dignity
concerns the circumstance that this concept is never
defined by law. But the truth is that this lack of definition
does not by itself prove that dignity is an empty concept or
a purely rhetorical notion. As a matter of fact, defining
dignity in clear-cut terms would be as difficult as defining
‘freedom,’ ‘justice’, ‘solidarity’, or whatever other key
social value (which by the way are never defined by law). It
is not because the idea of human dignity is too poor, but
because it is too rich that it cannot be encapsulated into a
straightforward definition with which everybody agrees. In
reality, its core meaning is quite clear and simple and
embodies a very basic requirement of justice towards every
individual. This requirement presupposes that ‘‘each person
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the
welfare of society as a whole cannot override’’ (Rawls
1973, p. 3).
Even in the absence of a definition, international law
offers a helpful guidance for a better understanding of the
concept of dignity when it provides: first, that dignity is
‘‘inherent… to all members of the human family’’ (UDHR,
Preamble); second, that all human beings are ‘‘free and
equal in dignity and rights’’ (UDHR, Article 1); third, that
‘‘these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person’’ (International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and International Covenant on Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights, Preambles). This latter statement is
particularly crucial: if basic rights are grounded on the
inherent worth of every human being and not on a merely
contingent decision of lawmakers or of the international
community, then they cannot be taken away by any
authority.
If the whole international human rights law system is
grounded on the idea of human dignity, the much more
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explicit and massive recourse to this notion in the recent
instruments relating to bioethics is really impressive. This
leads some to characterize human dignity as the ‘‘shaping
principle’’ of international bioethics (Lenoir and Mathieu
2004, p. 16).
Certainly, the principle of respect for human dignity is
by its very nature vague and general. Normally it does not
provide per se practical guidance in defining responses to
particular issues. But, as we will see below, the same
happens with all general principles. This is why, in order to
render human dignity more easily operational, the emerg-
ing instruments in this field combine the appeal to human
dignity as an overarching principle with the recourse to a
broad range of human rights that are relevant to health
issues (Andorno 2009).
A good example of this combined appeal to human
dignity and human rights in this area is provided by the
three UNESCO declarations relating to bioethics: the
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights (1997), the International Declaration on Human
Genetic Data (2003), and the Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). The latter one has the
merit of showing that human dignity plays not one, but
several, different roles, which are not exclusive from each
other: a) It embodies the central aim of the Declaration
(Art. 2.c); it is the first principle governing the whole field
of biomedicine (Art. 3); c) It is the main argument against
every form of discrimination, including for instance,
genetic discrimination (Art. 11); d) It is the framework
within which cultural diversity is to be respected (Art. 12);
e) It offers the interpretive key of all the provisions of the
Declaration (Art. 28).
Similarly to the UNESCO documents, the European
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 1997
(‘‘Oviedo Convention’’) and its additional Protocols give a
pivotal role to human dignity. Article 1 of the Convention,
which refers to the purpose and object of the document,
provides that ‘‘Parties to this Convention shall protect the
dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee
everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity
and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to
the application of biology and medicine.’’ Hence, the
purpose of the Convention is presented in two stages: first,
the protection of dignity and identity of human beings;
second, the safeguard of people’s integrity and other rights.
This means that a distinction is made between dignity and
rights.
Also Article 2 of the Biomedicine Convention is note-
worthy in this respect because it offers a direct corollary of
the idea of human dignity which is particularly relevant in
the field of bioethics: the primacy of the human being over
science and society. The ‘primacy principle’, which origi-
nates in the first version of the famous Declaration of
Helsinki of 1964 (Principle I.5), is like an echo of the
Nuremberg trials that condemned the Nazi physicians. Far
from being a ‘‘vacuous figure of speech’’ (Helgesson and
Eriksson 2008), it seeks to capture a very fundamental
idea: that ‘‘the person does not have to reach any functional
standard to be valuable as a person or to be treated with full
respect’’ (Parker 2010). In other words, the life and phys-
ical integrity of every individual (of every patient and of
every research participant) has intrinsic worth, and should
therefore not be treated as mere instruments for the benefit
of science or society.
Another important point that needs to be made is that
human dignity is usually characterized in negative terms,
for instance, by saying that it embodies the idea that people
must ‘‘never be treated in a way that denies the distinct
importance of their own lives’’ (Dworkin 1977, p. 236), or
that ‘‘there are some things that should not be done to
anybody, anywhere’’ (Midgley 1999, p. 160). It is not by
chance that, while most human rights are couched in
positive terms in international law (‘‘Everyone has the right
to…’’), those that aim to protect people against the most
serious violations of human dignity are formulated in
negative terms, in the form of prohibitions: ‘‘No one shall
be held in slavery or servitude’’; ‘‘no one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment’’ (Articles 4 and 5 of the UDHR, respectively).
Precisely because these rights derive very directly from
human dignity they are thought of as absolute, in the sense
that they are not subject to any exceptions.
The meaning of dignity can indeed be better grasped by
considering what is contrary to it rather than what is in
conformity with it. Evil is easier to identify than goodness.
It is when we are confronted to the worst things that can be
done to a human being that we better understand, by
contrast, what ‘‘dignity’’ means. Even the Kantian cate-
gorical imperative according to which no one is to be
treated as a mere means to another’s end can be regarded as
example of this via negativa. Therefore it can be claimed
that the first and primary task of the principle of human
dignity is to set a minimal threshold of respect for every
human being, i.e. to clearly indicate what practices are
absolutely incompatible with a civilized society. Only after
having established that minimum, the legal system can
seek to promote people’s well-being in positive terms.
This shows that the principle of respect for human
dignity operates on two different levels: the first and most
important, as a negative requirement, when it absolutely
forbids certain practices and therefore does not allow any
balance with other goods or principles. But human dignity
can also function as a positive requirement, notably, the
improvement of people’s quality of life (for instance,
through better schools and hospitals, a more efficient
transportation system, etc.). Such measures, which are
The dual role of human dignity in bioethics 969
123
ultimately grounded on the idea of human dignity, are of
course desirable, but not absolutely imperative (at least not
at any cost), and might therefore be weighed against other
social goods (for instance, the available financial resources
of a society).
Another brief remark that has to be made here is that the
principle of human dignity is in recent years used not only
to promote respect for the intrinsic worthiness of every
individual, but also of humankind as a whole. This deriv-
ative (or secondary) understanding of the classic notion of
human dignity takes place in the debate on some technol-
ogies that are regarded as a threat to the identity and
integrity of the human species such as human reproductive
cloning and germ-line interventions. On the one hand, the
criticisms of the use of human dignity with this broader
meaning are understandable, since it is much more abstract
than the traditional one, and can be misused, especially
when it is employed as a discussion-stopper and without
any additional explanation. On the other hand, we must
acknowledge that we do not have at hand any other term to
refer to the value of humankind as such other than ‘human
dignity’. It must be noted that resorting to human rights is
insufficient to cope with the new biotechnological chal-
lenges since human rights only belong to existing indi-
viduals, not to humanity as a whole.
Human dignity as a principle
Is the appeal to human dignity made by international policy
documents superfluous? Does the notion of dignity add
something to the much more concrete norms specifying
human rights? What is the relationship between dignity and
rights? These crucial questions lead us to resort to a con-
ceptual distinction, which is common in legal philosophy:
the one between rules and principles.
Although there is a long tradition in law to refer to
principles, the distinction between rules and principles has
become especially important in the last decades as a matter
of philosophical inquiry. Ronald Dworkin was probably the
first legal philosopher to systematically develop the dif-
ferences between these two categories of norms (Dworkin
1977, p. 22–28). According to him, both sets of standards
point to particular decisions about legal obligation, but they
differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. They require a
complete fulfilment: they can only be either fulfilled or not.
If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is
valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be
accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to
the decision. For instance, if a norm prohibits driving faster
than 50 km per hour, then the rule can only be either ful-
filled or not; it is not a matter of degree. There could be
however exceptions, for instance, in the case of a police car
pursuing the robbers of a bank, or of an ambulance
bringing a dying person to hospital.
But this is not the way principles work. Principles have a
dimension of weight (or importance). When principles
intersect, one has to take into account the relative weight of
each one in order to resolve the conflict. Neither of the
colliding principles loses its validity, but the losing prin-
ciple is considered to have less significance in the partic-
ular case. In other words, while conflicts between rules are
solved either by introducing an exception to one of them, or
by declaring one of them invalid, the collision between
principles is to be solved in a process of weighing.
The crucial point here is that principles alone do not
completely determine the content of a particular decision.
They just establish that something must be carried out to
the greatest possible degree in relation to the factual and
legal possibilities. Principles are ‘‘optimization com-
mands’’ (Optimierungsgebote), which can be carried out to
different degrees depending on the circumstances (Alexy
1994, p. 71–77).
Interestingly, many, if not most legal norms contain
principles, not rules. Thus their provisions can be applied
to different degrees, and will only become a rule after
having been weighed against other competing principles.
Even human rights, as they are formulated in legal docu-
ments, are principles, not rules; they do not provide per se a
clear-cut solution to concrete dilemmas; they have to be
balanced with other principles (such as competing rights,
the common good of society, etc.) in order to help pro-
viding a fair solution to a particular case.
Alexy explicitly mentions human dignity as a principle,
which only becomes a rule after having been balanced
against other principles. Like all principles, also dignity is
unable by itself to provide practical guidance in defining
responses to particular issues. But this does not mean that it
is useless. We should not expect from the idea of human
dignity more than it can offer. Anyway, as Alexy points
outs, even if dignity has to be weighed against other
principles, it is very likely to have priority over any of
them. Dignity is in this regard a kind of ‘‘super-principle’’
which not only provides the foundation of all legal and
social institutions, but also shows a general direction
towards which a civilized society should tend.
In any case, it seems that this process of weighing only
applies to human dignity when it deploys a positive role.
On the contrary, as mentioned above, when dignity
accomplishes its primary task as a negative requirement
and absolutely forbids specific practices (torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishments, etc.), it cannot be
weighed against any other principle. In such cases, which
are rather exceptional, dignity operates more like a rule
than like a principle.
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Another question that needs to be briefly addressed here
concerns the relation between human dignity and human
rights. In particular: why do we need the notion of dignity
if we already have that (much more concrete) of human
rights? Is dignity not a mere collective term to refer to
rights? The fact is that international law clearly distin-
guishes between dignity and rights: rights derive from
human dignity; human dignity is the foundation of human
rights; human dignity is not a kind of super-right, but rather
the ultimate source of all rights. The idea of human dignity
intends to respond to the question ‘‘why do human beings
have rights?’’. And the answer is that they are entitled to
rights precisely because they possess intrinsic worth.
Dignity as a moral standard of patient care
Dignity and vulnerability
While dignity as an overarching principle fulfils a foun-
dational and guiding role of the whole normative frame-
work governing biomedical issues, dignity as a standard for
patient care embodies a much more concrete and context-
specific vision of the patient as a ‘‘person’’. Both approa-
ches, far from being in conflict, are just two different sides
of the same coin. They are complementary. The general
approach (dignity as a policy principle) is the objective
component of dignity: it refers to the inherent value that
society recognizes in each of us; it is about how others see
each of us. The concrete approach (dignity as a standard for
patient care) relates to the subjective component of dignity:
it is a consequence of the inherent value that I recognize in
myself; it is about how I see myself; it results from my
awareness of being a ‘subject’ and not a mere ‘object’; it
leads me, if I am a patient, to reasonably expect certain
attitudes and behaviours from health care professionals.
Why is paying adequate attention to the dignity of each
patient crucial in health care? Why is the consideration of
how patients perceive themselves to be seen by others (i.e.
by health providers) essential for good medical practice?
The reason for this is that patients are in a situation of
greater vulnerability; they are particularly exposed to see
their self-esteem affected as they are deeply dependent on
the assistance of others, not only for the improvement of
their health condition, but also for meeting their most basic
needs. This makes them more sensitive to any behaviour or
attitude of health care professionals that might bee seen as
a disregard for their intrinsic value as persons. The ety-
mology itself of the word ‘‘patient’’ puts in evidence this
relationship with vulnerability. This term comes from the
Latin verb ‘‘patior,’’ meaning to endure, bear or suffer, and
refers to an acquired vulnerability and dependency
imposed to patients by their health situation (Chochinov
2002).
This close relationship that exists between dignity and
vulnerability is somehow paradoxical: the concept of
human dignity has been traditionally associated with the
highest rational capacities with which human beings are
endowed, with autonomous decision-making capacity, or
even with the human power to dominate nature. But the
fact is that dignity is more visible in weakness than in
power, in vulnerability than in self-sufficiency. Probably
the reason for this is that in the most vulnerable individuals
(such as newborns, elderly, seriously ill and dying patients,
people suffering from mental disabilities, etc.) human
dignity is not hidden behind the ornaments of great intel-
lectual or physical abilities, or good health, or beauty. The
worthiness of the human person is here exposed in its
nakedness; it is shown in its pure form. If this explanation
is right, one may conclude that, either one is able to rec-
ognize the inherent dignity of human beings in the most
vulnerable individuals, or will never really understand what
dignity means. Physicians and nurses are well aware of this
as they are constantly confronted with the human being in
its simple existence, and are required by the very nature of
their profession to discover the value of every patient in
that particular situation. They intuitively notice the crucial
importance of keeping in mind that each patient, no matter
what his or her diagnosis, is not a ‘case’, a ‘disease’, or a
room number, but a person with a unique character.
The patient-health care professional relationship is
indeed a paradigmatic occasion for a careful and active
defence of patient’s dignity. Certainly, this responsibility
does not only rely on doctors and nurses but also on family
members, friends and fellow patients. Pellegrino describes
well this need for a dignity-promotion behaviour when he
notes that patients, especially the seriously ill and dying
ones, are acutely sensitive to the way others in their pres-
ence react to them:
The visitor’s look of shock on entering the patient’s
room, the poorly disguised pity, the slight turning
away of the eyes, the ever shorter visits, the struggle
to say something meaningful, the mournful counte-
nance, the recoil from bodily contact –those reactions
all sustain the patient’s conviction that she or he is no
longer a respected, needed or wanted member of their
community or society (Pellegrino 2008, p. 527).
If promotion of patients’ dignity has always been a
crucial element of the medical profession, it has become
especially urgent in the time pressured context of modern
health care. In increasingly bureaucratic, impersonal and
commercialized hospitals, the risk is high of overlooking
that kindness, humanity and respect for each individual
patient are still (and will always be) core values of the
practice of medicine. This is why emphasizing the notion
that every human being is uniquely valuable and therefore
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must be esteemed highly is today more important than
ever.
A taxonomy of dignity
In the last decade a large number of empirical studies have
been carried out to better understand what dignity con-
cretely means from the patient’s perspective, either in
negative other in positive terms. In this regard, the tireless
human rights and public health advocate Jonathan Mann
has proposed a helpful taxonomy of dignity. He has iden-
tified four general ways in which dignity risks being vio-
lated, especially in the health care context (Mann 1998):
(a) Not being seen. It occurs when patients feel they have
been ignored or insufficiently acknowledged by health
care professionals. For example, if a physician does
not signal awareness of the patient’s presence by
avoiding shaking hand or making eye contact, patients
may feel that their dignity is threatened.
(b) Being seen but only as a member of a group. This
may happen, for instance, when patients are mainly
regarded as ‘‘women’’, or ‘‘senile’’, or ‘‘handi-
capped’’, or as members of any other general
category. This inclusion into a group may certainly
have relevance for an appropriate diagnosis and
treatment but, if not properly handled, risks hurt the
dignity of patients since they may feel that their
individual character is denied.
(c) Violations of the bodily space. Health care practice
often leads patients to disrobe and expose their bodies
to expert scrutiny. But, unless impossible (for
instance, in unconscious patients) physical examina-
tions must always be made with the explicit patient’s
permission and with an explanation of what is being
done to him or her. For the same reason, doctors must
always ask the patient’s permission to include
students or trainees in the clinical examination.
(d) Humiliation. This factor of dignity violation, which is
to some extent present in the three previous catego-
ries, might for instance happen when patients feel
ashamed by the careless way in which they are treated
by the hospital personnel, or interrogated about their
health insurance, or subtly discriminated on the
grounds of their poor social or economic status.
But dignity cannot only be violated. It can (and must)
also be positively promoted. Nora Jacobson has identified
several ways in which patients feel their dignity is
enhanced by health care professionals’ behaviour. She
mentions, among others: ‘‘presence’’ (keeping others
company); ‘‘concealment’’ (covering up embarrassing
markers of illness); ‘‘independence’’ (facilitating, as far as
possible, patient’s self-sufficiency and moral agency);
levelling (minimizing asymmetry); ‘‘creativity’’ (allowing
patients of making or sharing art); ‘‘courtesy’’ (demon-
strating common respect); and ‘‘authenticity’’ (honouring
individuality and personhood) (Jacobson 2009).
According to Canadian psychiatrist Harvey Chochinov,
the concept of ‘‘dignity’’ provides an overarching frame-
work that is able to guide the physician, patient, and family
in defining the objectives and modalities of any medical
intervention. He has conducted one of the few empirical
studies to specifically examine the understanding of dignity
by patients in an advanced stage of cancer and proposed a
new model of care for patients nearing death: the ‘‘dignity-
conserving care’’ model. This model includes three broad
areas of influence of individual perceptions of dignity:
illness-related concerns, i.e. those things that directly result
from the illness itself; the dignity-conserving repertoire,
i.e. those aspects of patients’ psychological and spiritual
landscape that influence their sense of dignity; and the
social dignity inventory, i.e. those social issues or rela-
tionship dynamics that enhance or detract from a patient’s
sense of dignity (Chochinov 2002).
More recent studies having focused on the meaning of
patient dignity in hospital settings come to similar con-
clusions: the consideration of patients’ dignity is of para-
mount importance to health care and its maintenance can
contribute to the ‘emotional comfort’ that may assist
recovery (Matiti and Trorey 2008; Baillie 2009). A number
of key themes that help enhancing patients’ dignity are
identified: privacy; confidentiality; communication and the
need for information; choice, control and involvement in
care; respect and decency and forms of address (Matiti and
Trorey 2008). The multi-factorial nature of patient dignity
is highlighted by the fact that it includes very heteroge-
neous elements such as feelings (feeling comfortable, in
control and valued), physical presentation, and staff
behaviour (Baillie 2009).
Conclusion
The notion of human dignity plays two different and
complementary roles in bioethics: one, as an overarching
principle that serves as the ultimate foundation and guiding
ideal of the legal norms relating to biomedicine; the other,
as a standard for concrete health care decisions at the
bedside.
Dignity as a general principle has a central place in
policy documents relating to biomedical issues and basi-
cally aims to emphasize the inherent value of every human
being. This general appeal to human dignity does not
intend to determine alone the content of particular deci-
sions but, more modestly, to show the overall aim of policy
documents and, at the same time, to give an ultimate reason
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for moving towards that direction. This is why the recourse
to human dignity is often combined with the appeal to a
wide range of health-related rights, which provide a more
effective and practical way forward for dealing with bio-
ethical matters.
Dignity as a standard of health care reflects a concrete
and context-specific understanding of the patient as a
‘‘person’’. It relates to the interaction between patients and
health care professionals in the specific and varied cir-
cumstances in which they find themselves. The importance
of dignity in this context results from the special vulnera-
bility that accompanies illness or injury. It requires from
doctors, nurses, and hospital staff to actively promote the
dignity of patients in each and every encounter, and to
avoid any behaviours that might hurt their self-esteem.
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